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INTRODUCTION
Just like flip phones and disco before it, nuclear power production in
the United States (“U.S.”) has all but died. Nuclear power plants situated
across the nation are being decommissioned as a result of an aging nuclear
fleet and an over-competitive energy market. 1 To the casual observer, the
days of pursuing the “Abundant Power [of the] Atom” may appear to be
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1. Denis Iurchak, 200 – 400 Nuclear Reactors to be Decommissioned by
2040, ENERGYPOST.EU (Feb. 11, 2020), https://energypost.eu/200-400-nuclearreactors-to-be-decommissioned-by-2040/ [https://perma.cc/AX7S-H3L9].
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long gone. 2 In reality, however, the practical use of nuclear energy is only
just emerging on the horizon with the promising development of small
modular reactor (“SMR”) technology. 3 This technology is a fraction of the
size of current reactors and is small enough to be manufactured in
factories. SMRs are also much safer and more versatile than previous
reactor technology and can be installed successively according to changes
in energy demands. 4 The small size and advanced safety features of SMRs
limit the effects on the surrounding environment, allowing these reactors
to meet applicable safety and environmental standards more easily than
their predecessors. As a result, SMRs have the potential to overcome the
massive delays and cost overruns that plague the current nuclear fleet. 5
Part I of this Comment offers a background on the regulations imposed
on nuclear power producing facilities by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) and explains their roles in the regulatory process. Part II describes
the current nuclear fleet, the problems associated with constructing these
reactors, and the construction delays which cause current reactors to be
noncompetitive in today’s energy market. This section then analyzes how
the applicable NRC and NEPA regulations affect traditional large reactors.
Lastly, Part II introduces the concept of large reactor construction as
megaprojects and discusses the drawbacks associated with megaprojects.
Part III describes the new SMR technology and analyzes its compliance
with both NRC and NEPA regulations, discussing the advantages that
SMRs have in completing the licensing and permitting processes. Part III
also discusses the practical benefits of SMRs compared to the current
nuclear fleet. Finally, Part IV illustrates how SMRs offer a viable solution
for producing marketable nuclear energy moving forward and examines
the practicality of using SMRs in tandem with renewable energy sources
to create a reliable carbon-free energy system.
2. See Abundant Power from Atom Seen; It Will Be Too Cheap for Our
Children to Meter, Strauss Tells Science Writers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1954),
https://www.nytimes.com/1954/09/17/archives/abundant-power-from-atom-seenit-will-be-too-cheap-for-our-children.html [https://perma.cc/F4AR-AG4R].
3. See NRC Approves First U.S. Small Modular Reactor Design, OFF. OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nrcapproves-first-us-small-modular-reactor-design [https://perma.cc/8TF8-HDKV].
4. See Bruce R. Huber, The New Nuclear? Small Modular Reactors and the
Future of Nuclear Power, 1 NOTRE DAME J. EMERGING TECH. 458, 460 (2020).
5. See Diane Cardwell, The Murky Future of Nuclear Power in the United
States, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/
business/energy-environment/nuclear-power-westinghouse-toshiba.html [https://
perma.cc/SZ47-SLZF].
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I. BACKGROUND: ASSIGNING THE ROLES OF NUCLEAR REGULATION
Following World War II, the U.S. government sought to incentivize
the advancement of nuclear energy, transitioning from the creation of
weapons of mass destruction to more peaceful applications of atomic
power. 6 In furtherance of this goal, Congress passed the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946 which, among other things, established the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), the first nuclear regulatory body in the U.S. 7 In 1954,
Congress replaced the 1946 version of the Atomic Energy Act with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, granting the AEC the power to regulate
nuclear energy development. 8 Specifically, the AEC was tasked with both
encouraging the development of nuclear power and establishing
regulations to ensure public safety. 9 By the 1960s, the AEC had become
the subject of considerable public scrutiny with many opponents, asserting
that the AEC’s rules and regulations regarding radiation control,
environmental protection, and overall public safety were far too relaxed. 10
By 1974, the AEC had undergone “such strong attack that Congress
decided to abolish the agency.” 11
Under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Congress established
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as the new regulatory body
for nuclear power in the U.S. 12 This was done in an effort to separate the
promotional and regulatory duties of nuclear power into different
agencies, assigning regulatory duties to the NRC and promotional duties
to the U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. 13 The NRC
is the current regulatory body governing U.S. nuclear power development,
6. OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, SCI. & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, DOE/NE-0088, at 8 (2002), https://www
.energy.gov/sites/default/files/The%20History%20of%20Nuclear%20Energy_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/83N9-52T9].
7. See History, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, https://www.nrc.gov/about
-nrc/history.html [https://perma.cc/EKZ9-35BL] (last updated Sept. 10, 2021).
8. Id.
9. See id. (“The AEC's regulatory programs sought to ensure public health
and safety from the hazards of nuclear power without imposing excessive
requirements that would inhibit the growth of the industry.”).
10. SAMUEL WALKER & THOMAS R. WELLOCK, OFF. OF THE SECRETARY,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, 2 NUREG/BR-0175, A SHORT HISTORY OF
NUCLEAR REGULATION, 1946-2009, at 25 (2010), https://www.nrc.gov/docs
/ML1029/ML102980443.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAY3-U33L].
11. See History, supra note 7.
12. See id.
13. See id.; see also WALKER & WELLOCK, supra note 10, at 49.
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focusing mainly on reactor permitting and licensing. 14 All nuclear reactors
in operation today were licensed under the NRC’s two-step permitting
process. 15 This process requires those seeking to build a nuclear power
plant (“licensees”) to obtain both a construction permit and an operating
license to build and operate a nuclear power plant. 16 To speed up the
permitting process, the NRC instituted a program in 1989 which allows
those seeking to build nuclear power plants to essentially combine the
construction permit and operating license into a single license called a
Combined License (“COL”). 17
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) “declare[s]
a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment . . . and stimulate the health and
welfare of man . . . ; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality.” 18 NEPA requires all government agencies to balance the benefits
of all major federal actions with the impact those actions will have on the
environment. 19 This includes evaluating “impacts on air; water; animal
life; vegetation; natural resources; and property of historic, archaeological,
or architectural significance” as well as any economic, social, and cultural
impacts the proposed construction may have. 20
In 1971, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals established the review of
environmental impacts as an integral role of the AEC, representing a major
turning point in nuclear reactor production in the U.S. 21 In Calvert Cliffs’,
the court held that NEPA requires environmental concerns to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis for a reactor to be properly licensed. 22 The federal
agency must then present these environmental concerns in a “detailed
statement” covering the impact of the proposed action on the
environment. 23 The court also determined that where the environment is
14. See History, supra note 7.
15. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, NUREG/BR-0298, NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS 1 (2009) [hereinafter NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
LICENSING PROCESS], https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML0421/ML042120007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7P44-R744].
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
19. See id.
20. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSING PROCESS, supra note 15, at 3.
21. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 1116.
23. Id. at 1114.
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negatively affected, NEPA requires alternative plans to be considered. 24
When considering these alternatives, the AEC must balance the technical
benefits of the proposed action with the negative impacts of such action
on the environment. 25 This case established the review of environmental
impacts as an integral role of the AEC and represents a major turning point
in production of nuclear reactors in the U.S. 26 These mandatory
environmental reviews are the source of major delays that plague nuclear
reactor construction and have largely led to the downfall of the U.S.
nuclear industry.
II. LARGE NUCLEAR REACTORS AND MEGAPROJECTS
Nuclear power reactors were pioneered in the U.S. in the early
1960s. 27 The first working reactor was designed by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation (“Westinghouse”) and had an output capacity of 250
Megawatts electric (“MWe”). 28 This reactor began operating in 1960 and
continued to run for several decades until it was finally decommissioned
in 1992. 29 Westinghouse’s innovation sparked nationwide interest in
nuclear energy which soon led to orders being placed for reactor units with
more than 1000 MWe by the end of the 1960s. 30 Early projections for the
future of nuclear power were optimistic, and expectations for its impact on
the U.S. energy market were high. Many believed that once in production
nuclear energy would be “too cheap to meter.” 31
Unfortunately, problems in the construction of these major nuclear
developments began to arise almost immediately. 32 Construction costs for
most plants quickly began to surpass projections, delays in project
timelines caused capital costs to rise even higher, and the predicted
increase in demand for electricity in the U.S. markets failed to
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See Outline History of Nuclear Energy, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N,
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-futuregeneration/outline-history-of-nuclear-energy.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZEW4-6766]
(last updated Nov. 2020).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Abundant Power from Atom Seen; It Will Be Too Cheap for Our Children
to Meter, Strauss Tells Science Writers, supra note 2 (quoting Lewis L. Strauss,
Chairman, Atomic Energy Comm’n, Address at the Twentieth Anniversary of the
National Association of Science Writers (Sept. 16, 1954)).
32. See Huber, supra note 4, at 460.
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materialize. 33 Adding fuel to the fire, the Three Mile Island accident of
1979 ignited a public belief that nuclear reactors were dangerous and unfit
for residential power needs. 34 With capital costs soaring and public
opinion generally disfavoring nuclear reactors, construction and licensing
of nuclear reactors came screeching to a halt, from which the U.S. nuclear
market has never fully recovered. 35
Of the hundreds of reactors that have been commissioned in the U.S.,
only 57 plants remain operational today. 36 This meager completion rate is
due, in large part, to the complexity of the plant design and the extremely
high capital costs associated with projects of this magnitude. 37 As nuclear
reactors have grown in complexity so too have the safety measures
required to ensure that both the public and the environment remain
protected. 38 To ensure adequate protection, nuclear reactors must be built
near bodies of water on large tracts of land and must be positioned far from
densely populated areas and in geologically favorable locations. 39
As a result of their extremely high capital costs, complex designs, and
numerous location challenges, traditional large nuclear reactors almost
always greatly exceed their budgets, rendering them unable to survive in
a competitive energy market. SMRs are the solution to these construction
problems because their small, modular nature allows them to circumvent
these issues.

33. See id.
34. See Nathan Hultman & Jonathan Koomey, Three Mile Island: The Driver
of US Nuclear Power’s Decline?, 69 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 63 (2013).
35. See id.
36. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): How Many Nuclear Power Plants
Are in the United States, and Where Are They Located?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=207&t=21 [https://perma.cc
/C85U-JLDL] (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
37. See Economics of Nuclear Power, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N,
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics
-of-nuclear-power.aspx [https://perma.cc/E6ER-YX8R] (last updated Sept.
2021).
38. Id.
39. See Lydia DePillis, A Nuclear Power Plant with a View: How Do Energy
Companies Decide Where to Build New Reactors?, SLATE (July 21, 2009, 2:37
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/07/how-do-energy-companies-de
cide-where-to-build-nuclear-power-plants.html [https://perma.cc/GZY5-63GL].
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A. Reactor Site Safety
Nuclear reactors are usually built on tracts of land that consist of at
least 500 acres. 40 This space is necessary to house heat management
facilities, computing facilities, fuel and waste storage areas, and the reactor
itself. 41 The NRC further requires the reactor site to be located far enough
away from any densely populated residential centers that an individual’s
exposure to radiation—in the event of an accident—would be below a
specified dose of harmful radiation. 42 The magnitude of this distance is
proportional to the size of the reactor and the safety measures incorporated
into the plant’s design. 43 The standard size of this emergency zone is ten
miles for current nuclear facilities. 44 The large size and complexity of
these nuclear plant sites means that more factors must conform to the NRC
regulations imposed by NEPA. The most significant factors that must be
considered are the exclusion area and low population zones, population
considerations, emergency planning, effects on local species, 45 water
availability, and water quality. 46
One safety requirement imposed by the NRC is an “exclusion area”
around the reactor. 47 The exclusion area is a space “surrounding the
reactor, in which the reactor licensee has the authority to determine all
activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. COMM’N OFF. OF NUCLEAR REGUL. RSCH., U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL.
REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7: GENERAL SITE SUITABILITY CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR
POWER STATIONS, at A-3 (2014) [hereinafter REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7],
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1218/ML12188A053.pdf [https://perma.cc/3REAMXDR].
43. See id. (“The required distances to the exclusion area boundary and the
outer boundary of the LPZ will depend on plant design aspects, such as the reactor
power level, allowable containment leak rate, and those engineered safety features
incorporated in the design, as well as the atmospheric dispersion characteristics
of the site.”).
44. Jeremy Dillon & Kristi E. Swartz, NRC Holds First Hearing for Small
Modular Reactor Site, E&E NEWS (Aug. 15, 2019, 6:57 AM), https://www.ee
news.net/energywire/stories/1060954519/print [https://perma.cc/6VDD-6XZM].
45. This includes factors such as: preservation of important habitats,
migratory routes of important species, entrainment and impingement of aquatic
organisms, and entrapment of aquatic organisms. See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7,
supra note 42, at B-5.
46. See id.
47. See generally 10 C.F.R. pt. 100 (2021).
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the area.” 48 The size of the exclusion area is determined by the minimum
distance from the reactor a person would need to be located to receive less
than a certain concentration 49 of total body radiation after two hours of
exposure following a radiation leak. 50 This area is immediately surrounded
by a low population zone (“LPZ”), and the size of the LPZ is similarly
determined by the distance which, at its outer boundary, a person would
receive a radiation dose less than a certain full body concentration 51 of
radiation after any amount of time following a radiation leak. 52
Additionally, the LPZ must be a minimum distance away from the “nearest
boundary of a densely populated center”; 53 this distance is directly
proportional to the distance from the reactor to the outer boundary of the
LPZ. 54 Both the exclusion area and the LPZ are proportional to the size of
the reactor. Thus, the larger the reactor, the greater the amount of radiation
that could potentially leak out, thereby requiring the reactor to be placed
farther away from populated areas. This increases the amount of land
needed to host a nuclear reactor, which consequently increases the cost
and time needed to establish these safe zones.
Other major considerations in the nuclear reactor construction process
are emergency planning and security. In general, the NRC requires that a
reactor site be capable of having an emergency plan prepared for a
specified zone surrounding the reactor. 55 This emergency plan must meet
the NRC’s 16 specified standards for the applicant to be approved for an
operating license. 56 The average sizes of these required emergency
planning zones (“EPZs”) are roughly a ten- and a 50-mile radius from the

48. 10 C.F.R. § 100.3; see also id. (“Residence within the exclusion area shall
normally be prohibited.”).
49. The certain concentration is 25 rem. See id. § 100.11(a).
50. Id.
51. The certain concentration is, again, 25 rem. See id.
52. Id.
53. REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at 17.
54. See id. at A-3 (“The size of the LPZ must be such that the distance to the
nearest boundary of a densely populated center with more than 25,000 residents
is at least one-and-one-third times the distance from the reactor to the outer
boundary of the LPZ.”).
55. See id. at A-5 (“The site should be examined and evaluated to determine
whether any characteristics would pose a significant impediment to taking actions
to protect the public in an emergency.”); see also 10 C.F.R. § 100.20.
56. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.47(b).
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reactors for the plume 57 and ingestion 58 exposure pathways, respectively. 59
Additionally, an evacuation time estimate (“ETE”) must be prepared to
“estimate the time that would be required to evacuate various sectors of
the plume exposure EPZ, including the entire EPZ.” 60 These ETEs must
consider population distribution and special population groups to assess
the practicality of taking protective measures for the population area
surrounding the reactor site in the event of an emergency. 61 Taking into
account the physical characteristics of the proposed site, security plans
must also be formed to protect from “radiological sabotage.” 62 The
implications of the size of the reactor on the EPZ are similar to those on
the aforementioned exclusion areas: the larger the reactor, the bigger the
EPZ must be and, thus, the more complex the plan. This is because a larger
EPZ encompasses more people to plan evacuation routes. The increase in
complexity also increases the time and money the planners must spend
studying the surrounding area and developing an emergency plan.
In Massachusetts v. United States Nuclear Energy Commission,
petitioners challenged, among other things, the NRC’s decision to grant
Seabrook Nuclear Power Station a license based on an alleged deficiency
in Seabrook’s emergency response plan. 63 This response plan was
designed to cover a ten-mile plume and 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ
surrounding Seabrook. 64 Petitioners alleged that if “specific hypothetical
accidents” were to occur, Seabrook’s plan “could not adequately protect
the large numbers of persons who visit the ocean beaches near Seabrook
on summer weekends.” 65 After reviewing Seabrook’s plan under a
deferential standard, the court ruled that Seabrook’s emergency plan was
sufficient to obtain an operating license. 66 This case illustrates the type of
57. See 44 C.F.R. § 350.2(h) (“Plume Exposure Pathway refers to whole body
external exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited
materials and inhalation exposure from the passing radioactive plume.”).
58. Id. § 350.2(i) (“Ingestion Exposure Pathway refers to exposure primarily
from ingestion of water or foods such as milk and fresh vegetables that have been
contaminated with radiation.”).
59. See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at 7.
60. See id. at A-6.
61. Id. at 19 (“Special population groups, such as those in hospitals, prisons,
schools, or other facilities, that could have special needs during an emergency
should be identified.”).
62. Id.
63. Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 924 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 316.
65. Id. at 317.
66. Id. at 324.
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legal challenges brought to oppose large reactors as a result of the massive
area they affect, which serve only to further delay the construction process.
These delays consequently drive up the costs of large reactors, further
hindering their ability to compete in today’s energy marketplace.
Traditional nuclear reactors also require massive amounts of water for
emergency shutdown and cooling purposes. 67 For this reason, nuclear
reactors must have access to a “highly dependable” source of water that
can be used “for water consumption in the quantities needed for a nuclear
power plant of the stated approximate capacity and type of cooling
system.” 68 These water sources must be capable of functioning as an
“ultimate heat sink” for the reactor(s) in the event a reactor must be shut
down. 69 Ultimate heat sinks must be capable of providing a 30-day supply
of cooling water to the reactor while also meeting any additional safety
measures required. 70 The licensee must also be able to obtain the
applicable state, local, or regional licenses to permit the licensee to use the
water for cooling purposes. 71 In addition to cooling capacity, the
“minimum low flow” of the water supply should be taken into account to
ensure the reactor’s cooling needs can be met in any condition. 72 Use of
natural water bodies for cooling purposes raises concerns over water safety
near nuclear reactor sites. Considering this, the NRC requires a licensee to
develop and follow a plan designed to minimize the radiation
concentration to surface and groundwater as much as is practicable. 73

67. See DePillis, supra note 39.
68. REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at A-7 to A-8.
69. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM'N OFF. OF NUCLEAR REGUL. RSCH.,
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27: GENERAL SITE SUITABILITY CRITERIA FOR NUCLEAR
POWER STATIONS 9 (2015), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1410/ML14107A411
.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y5S-NSZ6].
70. Id.
71. REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at 20.
72. Id. at 21.
73. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101 (2021) (“The licensee shall use . . . procedures
and engineering controls . . . to achieve occupational doses and doses to members
of the public that are as low as is reasonably achievable.”); see also 10 C.F.R. §
20.1406(a) (“Applicants for licenses, other than early site permits and
manufacturing licenses . . . shall describe in the application how facility design
and procedures for operation will minimize, to the extent practicable,
contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate eventual
decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of
radioactive waste.”).
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B. Environmental Concerns
Due to the massive size of traditional nuclear reactors and their use of
lakes and rivers as cooling water sources, reactor sites can have substantial
impacts on the surrounding environment. These reactors can negatively
impact important natural habitats and affect the migratory patterns of a
variety of different species. 74 Traditional reactors can also cause
substantial harm to the waters they use as well as to the organisms living
in or near those waters. 75 The NRC imposes limits on environmental
pollution that licensees must consider during the construction and
licensing of a new reactor or plant. 76 These environmental mandates are
set by statutes such as the Endangered Species Act, the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, the Clean Water Act, and several other environmental
statutes.
The NRC requires that parties consider their impact on “[i]mportant
habitats” in the area that could potentially be disrupted or destroyed by the
construction and operation of nuclear power plants. 77 This requires parties
to prepare environmental reports projecting their impact on endangered or
threatened species, breeding areas, seasonal migratory areas, and
harvestable crops. 78 Migratory patterns must not be disrupted by
obstruction of the water bodies used for reactor facility purposes, allowing
for normal passage of native species through the water body. 79
Additionally, intake and discharge systems for cooling water must be
engineered to reduce the accidental capture of organisms.80
The waters used for cooling are also subject to regulation under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) and the Clean Water Act
(CWA). 81 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the FWPCA
set the standards for water quality, which require a licensee to restore and
maintain the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 82 The FWPCA further requires that a licensee receive
certification from the state permitting discharge into applicable waters.83

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, app. B.
See id.
See id.
See id. at B-1.
See id.
See id. at B-2.
See id. at B-3.
See id. at B-5.
Id.
Id.
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This ensures all requisite state standards are met before the NRC issues a
permit. 84
The body of water that the licensee elects to use for cooling purposes
must also be of sufficient quantity as to not affect other individuals’ use of
the water. 85 This includes the body of water being large enough to
minimize the effects that the intake and subsequent discharge of the
cooling water have on the water source as a whole. 86 The strict adherence
to NEPA and NRC regulations causes nuclear construction projects to be
delayed, driving up the costs of construction even more.
In the Vermont Supreme Court case, In re Entergy, environmental
groups appealed a decision granting a permit amendment to Vermont
Yankee for a change in its pollutant discharge system.87 Vermont
Yankee’s cooling water system functioned by drawing water from the
Connecticut River to remove heat from the plant and then discharging the
water back into the river. 88 This discharge was subject to CWA
compliance, which requires an operator to obtain a permit for lawful
discharges into navigable waters. 89 Among other things, the environmental
groups claimed Vermont Yankee had failed to consider the “significant
impacts on [important] the species” of Atlantic salmon and American shad
found in the river, including possible effects on the seasonal migration,
breeding, and “cold water habitat” of the species. 90 The court found that
Vermont Yankee had sufficiently considered its impacts on the
Connecticut River and the species living within it, and therefore, the
permit amendment was properly granted. 91
Because they affect such a significant portion of their surrounding
environment, large nuclear plants like Vermont Yankee are subject to a
myriad of environmental standards, which in turn exposes them to
countless lawsuits challenging their compliance with these environmental
standards. Though Vermont Yankee was successful in this suit,
approximately six years elapsed between the plant’s application for a
permit amendment in 2003 and its approval following the decision in this
lawsuit in 2009. 92 In re Entergy further illustrates how suits brought
84. Id.
85. See id. at B-6.
86. See id.
87. In re Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee Discharge Permit 3-1199, 989
A.2d 563, 567 (2009).
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342.
90. See In re Entergy, 989 A.2d at 575, 583.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 569.
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against large reactors can cause years of operational and construction
delays. These delays consequently increase the cost of energy production
from large reactors to a degree at which the energy produced is no longer
economically competitive.
C. Megaprojects
For the past 15 years, Georgia Power has been expanding its Vogtle
plant by adding two 1,100 MWe nuclear reactors, known as Units Three
and Four. 93 These are the first reactors to be produced in the U.S. for
decades, and in 2012 they became the first reactors to ever be licensed
under the NRC’s one-step Combined Licensing (“COL”) program. 94 This
program was designed by the NRC to streamline licensing of new reactors.
Georgia Power commenced this project in 2006 and initially scheduled its
two new reactors for completion by 2016 and 2017 with the total cost of
the project estimated at $14.3 billion. 95 Units Three and Four began
experiencing delays almost immediately, with construction falling five
months behind schedule in June of 2011. 96 Only two months later, NRC
inspectors discovered that rebar 97 had been improperly installed, pushing
the project to one year behind schedule. 98
As a result of the delays, costs began to quickly overrun projections
with more than a $1 billion increase in the initial cost estimate by 2013—
only three years after construction actually began. 99 The Vogtle project
has continued in similar fashion throughout the years. 100 Currently, the
reactors are scheduled to be operational in 2021 and 2022 respectively,
with cost estimates exceeding $27 billion. This puts the project over four
years behind schedule and $13 billion over budget—nearly double the
initial projected costs. The problem of drastically overshooting costs is not
unique to the Georgia Power project, nor even to nuclear power plant
construction projects in general. Rather, it is a larger problem that plagues
93. See Sonal Patel, How the Vogtle Nuclear Expansion’s Costs Escalated,
POWER MAG. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/how-the-vogtlenuclear-expansions-costs-escalated/ [https://perma.cc/9S3J-9R4R].
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Rebar is short for “reinforcing bar.” What Is Rebar?, METAL
SUPERMARKETS (June 8, 2021), https://www.metalsupermarkets.com/what-isrebar/ [https://perma.cc/7NRP-VEHN].
98. See Patel, supra note 93.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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all large-scale, complex construction projects. These kinds of projects are
colloquially known as “megaprojects.”
Megaprojects are “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a
billion dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve
multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact
millions of people.” 101 Megaprojects encompass a wide variety of
developments spanning from public works, such as the Sydney Opera
House and the Olympics, to infrastructure and energy projects, such as the
Channel Tunnel in Europe and the nuclear power plants currently under
construction in Georgia. 102 Megaprojects are plagued by a unique set of
challenges brought on by the large capital costs, extensive planning and
construction times, and first-of-a-kind nature inherent to all
megaprojects. 103 Taken together, these factors make megaprojects a
nightmare to manage, almost always leading to massive cost and time
overruns. 104
On average, nine out of ten megaprojects experience cost overruns. 105
Moreover, only one of ten megaprojects is completed on schedule. 106
Frequent delays can quickly push projects years behind, causing further
cost overruns as a result. In a study conducted by Bent Flyvbjerg, a
prominent authority in the field of megaproject planning and management,
it was noted that a delay of one year causes an average of 4.64% cost
overrun for a megaproject. 107 If, for example, a $22 billion project was
delayed by one year, the added cost to the project would be over $1 billion.
In this way, a megaproject can quickly spiral into disaster, which through
a “combination of escalating construction costs, delays, and increasing
interest payments makes it impossible for project revenues to cover costs,
rendering projects non-viable.” 108 Because the energy market is largely
101. See BENT FLYVBJERG, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEGAPROJECT
MANAGEMENT 3 (Bent Flyvbjerg ed., 2017).
102. See id. at 4, 9; see also Bent Flyvbjerg, Design by Deception: The Politics
of Megaproject Approval, 22 HARV. DESIGN MAG. 50, 52 (describing the process
by which costs associated with megaprojects are intentionally underestimated to
achieve initial approval).
103. See FLYVBJERG, supra note 101, at 8.
104. See id. at 4 (“The size of megaprojects is staggering no matter what you
compare with, and is matched only by the challenges of managing one.”).
105. See id. at 9.
106. See id. at 11 (“If, as the evidence indicates, approximately one out of ten
megaprojects is on budget, one out of ten is on schedule, and one out of ten is on
benefits, then approximately one in a thousand [megaprojects] is a success,
defined as on target for all three.”).
107. Id. at 10.
108. See id. at 11.
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unregulated, nuclear projects going over budget means higher rates must
be charged to consumers to recuperate construction costs. 109 This makes
nuclear energy an expensive option for electricity, putting it at an
insurmountable disadvantage in a hypercompetitive energy market. 110
The very nature of megaprojects causes them to experience excessive
delays and vast cost overruns. When combined with the environmental and
technical issues that inevitably complicate the construction of nuclear
power plants, the idea of large nuclear megaprojects being completed on
time and on budget becomes little more than a fantasy.
III. THE NUCLEAR FUTURE: SMALL MODULAR REACTORS
SMRs are beginning to be licensed for production in the U.S. as a
result of clean power initiatives by both the federal government and private
actors. 111 As their name implies, the key aspects of SMRs are their small
size and modular construction. 112 SMRs are categorized as reactors that
produce under 300 MWe, have small physical footprints, and are designed
for serial production due to their modular nature. 113 The unique
characteristics of SMRs allow them to be built in “controlled factory
settings.” 114 From there, the reactors can be transported and installed
“module by module” at designated plant sites as the need for power
arises. 115
As previously mentioned, a key advantage of SMRs is their ability to
adhere to one approved design, enabling them to be mass produced at a
much faster and cheaper rate than traditional large nuclear reactors.116 This
capability shifts nuclear reactor production from what is known as “first109. Huber, supra note 4, at 460.
110. See id.
111. See NuScale SMR Receives US Design Certification Approval, WORLD
NUCLEAR NEWS (Sept. 1, 2020), https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/NuScale
-SMR-receives-US-design-certification-appro.
112. Huber, supra note 4, at 470.
113. Small Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, https://www
.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactor
s/small-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx [https://perma.cc/UM69-TANP] (last updated
Dec. 2021); see also Huber, supra note 4, at 472–73.
114. Small Nuclear Power Reactors, supra note 113.
115. Id. (“Because of their small size and modularity, SMRs could almost be
completely built in a controlled factory setting and installed module by module,
improving the level of construction quality and efficiency.”); see also Huber,
supra note 4, at 472.
116. Huber, supra note 4, at 470.
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of-a-kind” (“FOAK”) projects to “nth-of-a-kind” (“NOAK”) projects. 117
FOAK projects are projects whose particular design and specifications
have never been built before. 118 FOAK projects present even seasoned
manufacturers with “new and unsolved problems” to be resolved during
construction. 119 These problems often lead to considerable delays in
construction, causing significant increases in the cost of FOAK projects. 120
In contrast, NOAK production projects are repeated over and over again
using the same methods and manufacturers each time. 121 NOAK projects
benefit substantially from previous experience, resulting in the
streamlining of production and subsequent decrease in production costs. 122
Costs of NOAK reactor production will continue to decrease as supply
chains are developed via third-party production of parts. 123 This in turn
creates a competitive market for reactor parts, further decreasing costs for
reactor production. 124
Though their predecessors have radiated a fear of nuclear power into
public opinion, SMRs are actually remarkably safe. SMRs employ passive
safety features that eliminate the need for elaborately engineered safety
systems found in traditional nuclear reactors. 125 This causes SMRs to be
both safer and more cost effective than their larger predecessors, meaning
the reactors are also easier to license since safety is less of a concern.
Passive safety features are those that do not require an external power
source or safety system to function, relying “only on physical phenomena
such as convection, gravity, or resistance to high temperatures, not on [the]
functioning of engineered components.” 126 These passive fail-safes can
117. Id. at 472.
118. See Lauren M. Boldon & Piyush Sabharwall, Small Modular Reactor:
First-of-a-Kind (FOAK) and Nth-of-a-Kind (NOAK) Economic Analysis, IDAHO
NAT’L LAB’Y 2 (2014).
119. Huber, supra note 4, at 471.
120. See Boldon & Sabharwall, supra note 118, at 2 (“It is for this reason that
FOAK plants are traditionally 15-55% more expensive than subsequent nonFOAK plants.”).
121. See id.; see also Huber, supra note 4, at 471.
122. See Huber, supra note 4, at 470–71.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 472.
125. See About Us, NUSCALE, https://www.nuscalepower.com/about-us (last
visited Oct. 18, 2021). NuScale, a leading company in SMR technology, states
that “[their] advanced SMR design eliminates two-thirds of previously required
safety systems and components found in today’s large reactors.” NuScale Power,
AZO CLEANTECH, https://www.azocleantech.com/suppliers.aspx?SupplierID=
1732 [https://perma.cc/92U6-H3GE] (last visited Oct. 30, 2021).
126. Huber, supra note 4, at 474 n.70.
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make use of gravity by releasing cooling water from pools situated above
the reactors in the event that external control of the reactor is lost or the
reactor begins to overheat. 127 The cooling water will then initiate reactor
shutdown, after which the reactor can be turned back on once the problem
has been corrected. 128
SMRs also have a very small physical footprint compared to other
power-producing plants—nuclear or otherwise. 129 The reactor units can be
as small as 75 feet tall and 15 feet wide—only slightly larger than two
school buses set end to end—while traditional reactors require more than
a square mile to operate. 130 Due to their increased safety and smaller size,
SMRs can be located much closer to residential areas than larger plants. 131
Their small size, however, also means they produce less power than larger
reactors. 132 Some sites will therefore need multiple SMRs to match the
energy output capabilities of larger plants. Luckily, this too works to
benefit SMRs, as each reactor can be powered on independently as it is
installed, allowing the plant to begin generating profits while the rest of
the plant is still developing.133 The ability to start producing profits before
the plant is fully developed allows investors to reduce their capital risk by
receiving a return on their investments before more money is spent to
further develop the plant. As a result, SMRs are a much more costeffective and versatile means of providing carbon-free nuclear energy to
the economy. This cost efficiency is coupled with much lower risks than

127. Id. at 474.
128. See NuScale Power, supra note 125 (“This Triple Crown For Nuclear
Plant Safety™ design safely shuts down and self-cools, indefinitely with no
operator action, no AC or DC power, and no additional water.”).
129. See Advanced Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), OFF. OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY [hereinafter SMRs], https://www.energy.gov/ne/advanced-small-modu
lar-reactors-smrs [https://perma.cc/XAM8-NZ7K] (last visited Oct. 28, 2021).
130. See Technology Overview, NUSCALE, https://www.nuscalepower.com/
technology/technology-overview [https://perma.cc/3MMW-5WZB] (last visited
Oct. 18, 2021) (“The reactor measures 65 feet tall x 9 feet in diameter. It sits
within a containment vessel measuring 76 feet tall x 15 feet in diameter.”); see
also OFF. OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE ULTIMATE FACTS
GUIDE TO NUCLEAR ENERGY 6 (2019), https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files
/2019/01/f58/Ultimate%20Fast%20Facts%20Guide-ebook_1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BZ8V-RM82] (“A typical 1,000-megawatt nuclear facility in the United States
needs a little more than 1 square mile to operate.”).
131. See SMRs, supra note 129.
132. Nuscale’s reactors produce only 60 MWe per reactor unit. See
Technology Overview, supra note 130.
133. Huber, supra note 4, at 474.
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traditional nuclear reactors, as SMRs require less capital investment and
are less likely to face delays during licensing and construction.
A. Reactor Site Safety
SMRs are subject to the same NRC and NEPA requirements as larger
nuclear reactors: exclusion area and low population zone, population
considerations, emergency planning, effects on local species, water
availability, and water quality. 134 Due to their smaller physical footprint,
however, SMRs necessarily impact the environment less than a large
nuclear facility does. This enables SMRs and their reactor sites to be
licensed and constructed more efficiently than large reactor sites, as their
environmental impacts are typically both smaller in scale and less severe.
As mentioned above, the exclusion area is the area surrounding the
reactor that is under the authority of the reactor licensee. This area is
determined by the minimum distance a person would need to be from a
reactor to receive less than a certain concentration 135 of total body
radiation after two hours of exposure resulting from a radiation leak. 136
Since SMRs produce less radiation than traditional large nuclear power
plants, the exclusion area required for an SMR reactor would be much
smaller, allowing SMRs to be placed much closer to residential areas than
traditional reactors. Likewise, the LPZ137 would be proportionally smaller
due to the decreased potential radiation output of the reactor. The
decreased sizes of the exclusion area and the LPZ decrease the amount of
land needed to host a nuclear reactor and thereby decrease the construction
costs. 138
SMRs are significantly safer than large nuclear reactors because of
their passive safety features. 139 They are also better protected from terrorist
attacks and natural disasters because they are situated underground. 140
These increased safety factors translate to much smaller EPZs surrounding
SMRs as well. Whereas the average size for an EPZ is traditionally ten
miles, the NRC is considering a proposed rule that would establish a
scalable approach for SMRs based on the distance from the reactor that
harmful doses of radiation could reach, abandoning the current ten- and
134. See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at B-5.
135. The certain concentration is 25 rem. See 10 C.F.R. § 100.11 (2021).
136. Id.
137. The area surrounding the exclusion area which, at its outer boundary, a
person would receive less than 25 rem of total body radiation. See id.
138. See Economics of Nuclear Power, supra note 37.
139. See SMRs, supra note 129; see also Huber, supra note 4, at 474 n.70.
140. See SMRs, supra note 129.
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50-mile standards for EPZs. 141 Early predictions of EPZs for SMRs are as
small as a two-mile radius. 142 Reduction of the size of the EPZ also
necessarily reduces the time and costs associated with planning,
decreasing the overall cost of the SMR project.
Whereas traditional nuclear reactors require large amounts of water
for emergency shutdown and cooling purposes, SMRs rely on passive
safety features inherent in their designs. 143 These small reactors can rely
solely on a water tank placed above the reactor instead of requiring a
moderately sized lake or river for cooling. 144 This effectively eliminates
the requirement that a reactor site be located near a body of water, allowing
SMRs to be placed in a wide variety of locations not accessible to large
reactors. In other words, it makes meeting the NRC’s requirement of a
“highly dependable” water source as simple as installing a water tank. 145
Though SMRs will still need to develop plans for decreasing surface water
and groundwater radiation, the fact that most SMRs will be buried
underground and do not require natural waters for cooling will drastically
decrease their chances of causing harmful levels of radiation to nearby
water sources. 146
B. Environmental Concerns
As a consequence of their relatively limited interaction with the
environment, SMRs have a significantly smaller environmental impact
compared to larger nuclear, natural gas, or coal-burning facilities. Meeting
141. See Jeremy Dillon & Kristi E. Swartz, NRC Takes Significant Steps on
Reactor Licensing, E&E NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019, 4:52 PM), https://www.ee
news.net/eenewspm/stories/1061837749/search?keyword=tva%27s+plan+for+s
mall+reactors+clears.
142. See id. (“TVA provided methodology that demonstrated its planning zone
for its site could be reduced to as far as 2 miles. In its environmental impact
statement, the NRC staff took no issue with such methodology.”).
143. See Huber, supra note 4, at 474 n.70.
144. See id. at 474.
145. See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at A-7.
146. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101(b) (2021) (“The licensee shall use . . . procedures
and engineering controls . . . to achieve occupational doses and doses to members
of the public that are as low as is reasonably achievable.”); see also 10 C.F.R. §
20.1406(a) (“Applicants for licenses, other than early site permits and
manufacturing licenses . . . shall describe in the application how facility design
and procedures for operation will minimize, to the extent practicable,
contamination of the facility and the environment, facilitate eventual
decommissioning, and minimize, to the extent practicable, the generation of
radioactive waste.”).
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NRC and NEPA mandated environmental standards is therefore much
easier for SMRs. Due to their placement underground, SMRs are likely to
have substantially less impact on important habitats and on animals’
migratory patterns. 147 Aquatic animals and water quality are likewise
unlikely to be affected, as SMRs do not require use of natural water bodies
to safely operate. SMRs operators will also not need to apply for
certification from the FWPCA because they will not need to discharge
pollutants into any of the nation’s waters. 148 Additionally, other concerns
regarding local water pollution can largely be put to rest given SMRs’
limited contact with public waters. Their limited interaction with the
environment further reduces the time needed to license and construct
SMRs and thus makes them a more financially and environmentally sound
option for achieving clean, reliable energy.
IV. A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO A REGULATORY PROBLEM
Large nuclear reactor construction and operation suffer from a variety
of regulatory issues causing the energy produced to become too expensive
to effectively market. The solution to these regulatory issues is SMR
technology. SMRs represent a beacon of hope—or perhaps an emergency
flare for an industry in need of rescue—for the practical use of sustainable
nuclear energy. The versatility and safety of SMRs enable them to be
utilized in eliminating the need for carbon-based energy sources entirely
because although the energy provided by renewables such as solar and
wind power is clean, it is not reliable. The fundamental weakness of
renewables is dependence on optimal weather conditions. Because
renewable energy cannot yet be effectively stored for long periods of time,
an especially cloudy or windless day could leave communities that operate
solely on renewables without power for as long as it takes for favorable
weather conditions to return. 149 When used in tandem with SMRs,
however, renewable energy could serve as a reliable source of energy for
a completely carbon-free energy market.
Unlike natural gas, coal-burning, and large nuclear facilities, SMRs
are capable of switching on and off to suit current energy demands. 150 This
means when conditions are favorable and renewables are producing
substantial amounts of energy, SMRs can be switched off as needed to
prevent energy waste. 151 On the other hand, when renewable energy
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See REGULATORY GUIDE 4.7, supra note 42, at B-1.
See id. at B-5.
See Huber, supra note 4, at 467.
Id. at 460.
See id.
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production is insufficient to meet demand, SMRs can simply be switched
on to satisfy power needs. 152 Essentially, energy production could be
scalable to current demands which would reduce energy cost as well as
waste.
SMRs allow for a degree of versatility in meeting energy demands not
available in the current market. This versatility would also allow SMRs to
be used for the creation of smaller power grids, known as “microgrids.”
Microgrids are more efficient and can be controlled more acutely than
larger electrical grids. A simple advantage of microgrids is that power
outages will affect smaller areas, only powering down the small portion of
the grid that is affected. This means more reliable power for more people.
A notable example of the practical advantages that SMRs can provide
is how they could have been used to avoid major disasters such as the
Texas power crisis of 2021. In February of 2021, an extreme and historic
cold front overtook the southern U.S., causing radical effects on the energy
infrastructure of several states. The intense cold caused many power
generators—natural gas, coal, solar, large nuclear, and wind alike—to
cease energy production as their utilities proved ill-prepared to handle the
brutal cold. Nowhere was this more prevalent than Texas, where reports
of state-wide blackouts received national media attention, left millions of
people without power, and eventually led to the deaths of over 200
people. 153 Damages from the blackouts are estimated at over $195 billion
in damages, making it the most expensive disaster in Texas to date. 154
Numerous lawsuits have already been filed against Texas energy providers
for their failure to keep the lights on. 155
To understand why Texas in particular was hit so hard, it is important
to first understand the basics of Texas’s energy structure. In addition to
being a deregulated energy market, Texas is the only state in the U.S. to

152. Id.
153. See Andrew Weber, Texas Winter Storm Death Toll Goes Up to 210,
Including 43 Deaths in Harris County, HOUS. PUB. MEDIA (July 14, 2021, 2:07
PM), https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/energy-environment/202
1/07/14/403191/texas-winter-storm-death-toll-goes-up-to-210-including-43-deaths
-in-harris-county/#:~:text=The%20Texas%20Department%20of%20State,because
%20of%20the%20winter%20storm [https://perma.cc/8XUM-ZUMP].
154. See Matthew Hall, The Great State of Texas: Explaining the Power Crisis
and What Happens Next, POWER TECH. (May 24, 2021), https://www.powertechnology.com/features/the-great-state-of-texas-explaining-the-power-crisis-andwhat-happens-next/ [https://perma.cc/8DBH-25RC].
155. See, e.g., In re Winter Storm Uri Litigation, No. 21-0313 (Tex. Apr. 7,
2021).
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independently run its power grid without federal oversight. 156 Because
Texas’s energy market is deregulated and operates independently, Texas
cannot rely on energy coming from out-of-state as a backup in the event
of an emergency. 157 What this means is that Texas is essentially an “energy
island” when it comes to energy transmission. 158 While other states are
able to draw from the veritable ocean of electricity flowing through and
produced by neighboring states, Texas is left shipwrecked when disaster
strikes. 159
In response to Texas’s power vulnerabilities being exposed, proposals
are being made on how best to make Texas’s energy system more stable
and reliable. 160 One leading proposal is the implementation of
microgrids. 161 Implementation of microgrids would limit the area affected
when larger transmission lines go down and allow use of any local
residential solar panels to power an individual grid. Microgrids alone,
however, do not solve Texas’s reliability problem. The glaring issue with
renewables such as solar and wind is that when weather conditions are not
ideal, energy production suffers or ceases altogether. In fact, solar panel
and wind turbine failure accounted for roughly 13% of total power loss
during the Texas power crisis. 162 Without a reliable source of backup
power, there is little standing in the way of another power crisis. This is
where SMRs come in.
The implementation of SMRs into neighborhood-sized microgrids
would allow Texas to sustain a reliable source of backup power while
maintaining its energy independence from the rest of the continental U.S.
Texas could continue to offer natural gas when cheaper and simply switch
on its SMRs when gas prices make them marketable. More importantly,
156. See Hall, supra note 154.
157. See Garrett T. Galvin, Lone Star Solar: Challenges and Opportunities in
Post-Blackout Texas, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com
/article/lone-star-solar-challenges-and-opportunities-post-blackout-texas [https://pe
rma.cc/L759-P2QM].
158. Id.
159. See id. (“All of the other 47 states in the continental United States connect
their grids to either the Eastern Interconnection grid or the Western
Interconnection grid, and these multi-state systems maintain the ability to transmit
power from one region to another, serving as a useful safeguard against grid
failures during extreme, relatively local weather events.”).
160. See id. (“Since the energy crisis, Texas lawmakers have advanced a
number of proposals and amendments to prevent similar, or more severe, crises
in the future while maintaining energy independence from the rest of the
continental United States . . . .”).
161. See id.
162. See id.
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SMRs could be readily switched on in case of an emergency. Unlike solar,
wind, and even fossil fuels, SMRs are far less susceptible to inclement
weather. This is because they are buried underground, and as such, are
shielded come hell, highwater, or deep freeze.
SMRs are also cost competitive with natural gas sources. Natural gas
is currently the cheapest source of energy, but it produces massive
amounts of greenhouse gases in its energy production. By decreasing the
cost of reactors through serial production and enabling systematic
activation of SMRs as larger plants are built, the costs of nuclear energy
shrink immensely. Even if nuclear costs decrease, however, natural gas
will likely continue to be cheaper in the current deregulated energy market.
For this reason, a carbon tax should be imposed on power plants which
would tax the plant per specific volume of carbon dioxide produced. This
would essentially level the playing field between nuclear and natural gas
plants and incentivize companies to seek greener energy alternatives. With
the depletion of fossil fuels and the growing concern over climate change,
it may be the perfect time for nuclear power to step up to the plate.
CONCLUSION
In its current state, nuclear energy is not a viable source for energy
production in a competitive energy market. Construction of traditional
large nuclear reactors is plagued by cost overruns and delays that can push
projects back several years and cost billions of dollars more than projected.
Construction delays are a result of the complex management endemic to
megaprojects as well as extensive environmental compliance mandated by
NEPA and the NRC. Cooling and safety requirements necessary for large
nuclear reactor design all but require these reactors to have a large impact
on the environment. Extensive cooling water systems and large emergency
planning zones drastically limit the areas where nuclear reactors can be
placed and add years of delay to a project. In contrast, SMRs offer a
promising solution to the problem of sourcing economically viable nuclear
energy in the U.S. SMRs can be produced in factories at much faster rates
for a fraction of the cost of traditional reactors and are not subject to many
of the regulatory delays that have historically plagued the nuclear industry.
SMRs can also be used alongside renewable energy sources to create
reliable carbon-free energy and smaller, more efficient energy grids. With
all the advantages that SMRs bring, they offer a promising look at attaining
truly clean energy.

